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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Development of communication industry in China was several adjusted by government severally which 
have great impact on the relation of competition and cooperation for several oligopolies in Chinese 
communication marketing. This paper select adjusting policies as dividing line to analysis marketing 
structure and game results of oligopolies in Chinese communication marketing. Analysis method in this 
paper can be reference to complete information dynamic game when price and output changes in the 
same time. 
China Telecom, as first professional service supplier in fixed network of communication, appearance 
in communication marketing. Then communication service of China Mobile and China Unicom which 
appear in marketing one after the other have substitute effect for fixed network of China Telecom. China 
Unicom, though as all- operation supplier, has been supplied little communication service on fixed 
network, and has little impact on fixed network communication marketing. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Cournot competition model (Cournot, 1838) and Stackelberg competition model (Von Stackelberg, 1934) 
can be a good description for oligopoly market competition. One of the focuses of research on 
oligopolistic competition is to discuss the circumstances under which oligarchs to obtain the advantages 
of action. Sherali, etc. (1983) structured and researched Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium of one 
leading oligarch and N after mover oligopolies and testify the existence and uniqueness of solution. Later, 
Sherali (1984) expanded Stackelberg duopoly model, constructed and studied competitive model of 
multi first move oligarchs multi follow oligarchs, pointed out that classic Stackelberg model and 
Cournot model are special cases and that profits of first move oligopoly is higher than follow oligopolies 
in order to yield competitive output, draw the conclusion that new entering oligopolies will inevitably 
reduce the profits of the existing oligarchies. Gal-Or (1985) pointed out the difference of first mover and 
second mover advantages under various reaction function. Dowrick (1986) proposes by duopoly model 
that oligarchs will be the first mover for the corresponding advantages or for second mover advantage as 
long as the oligarchs’ response to competition in the market by different functions. Daughety (1990) 
analyzed that Stackelberg equilibrium game solution of m first mover oligarchies and n-m follow 
oligopolies under normal circumstances. Haan, Marks (1996) researched duopoly of Stackelberg model 
and the Cournot model from the welfare point of view and pointed out that Stackelberg competition does 
not necessarily improve the welfare when the market entry barriers exist. Wolf, Smeers (1997) 
constructed stochastic Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot model, discussed on equilibrium solution and 
corresponding characterizes and verified by European gas market. But Vander Werf etc. (1997) 
investigated experimental methodology of first move advantage by comparative analysis and think that 
different experimental methods have significant impact on the results. Muceller (1997) investigated path 
dependency of first move advantage for leading oligarchs in special industrial period. Oligopoly 
production and social welfare aspects is on attention of oligopolistic competition of game. Matsumura 
(1999) research role of stock in a multi-period game and conditions of become a Stackelberg leader by 
analysis on limited stage Cournot duopoly game model. Okuguchi (1999) pointed out that different 
reaction function cause not only different game equilibrium but also led to various Stackelberg model 
and the Cournot model output and profits through analysis of the duopoly model. Rassenti, etc. (2000) 
studied on the convergence of equilibrium solution for repeated Cournot competition game. Huck, etc. 
(2001) study learning model in Cournot competition game, researched duopoly Stackelberg model and 
the Cournot model by the way of experimental economics and compared the total output and efficiency 
of different models. Then, Huck, etc. (2002) investigated on influence of External conditions on game 
results from the perspective of experimental economics in duopoly Stackelberg model. Game model 
mentioned above is mainly focus on duopoly classic competition.  
From the current literature, as restrictions of demand function of the, linear function of demand 
cannot be used to construction game model when prices and production changes at the same time. 
However, in the communications market, the case is that the price and output (here is number of users) 
changes at the same time, thus demand cannot be used to direct analysis China's oligarchs 
telecommunications market. And more, there are no literature on multi oligarchies Cournot model 
and multi oligarchies Stackelberg model to analysis move advantage, output and profit for follow 
oligarchies. This paper present further study on multi oligarchies game and price and output 
changing at the same time game which can be used to explain China's oligarchs telecommunications 
market. 
 
3.  IMPORTANT HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1  Suppose products and service supplied by China Telecom and China Netcom has no difference. 
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Profit of oligopolies is decides directly by price and output, other factors have no effect on profit of 
communication service suppliers. Output of communication marketing is composed by communication 
time and number of consumer. 
 
3.2  For analysis convenience, we assume communication time of consumer is constant. Because output 
of service suppliers is equal to talk span multiple with number of consumers, then output of 
communication is decided only by number of consumers. 
 
3.3  Given scale of China Netcom is equal to China Telecom when separated from China Telecom in 
2004, north and south marketing is absolute symmetry. This hypothesis makes analysis easy to complete. 
 
4.  DEMAND FUNCTION 
 
Analysis is based on demand and supply function. For studying communication marketing of fixed 
network clearly, we suppose that fix cost of each oligopoly is no difference. And more, number of 
consumers developed by each service supplier is proportional to service price of each oligopoly. The 
relation can be express as follows: 
p a bq= −                                         (1) 
The cost of oligopolies mainly composed by management cost of consumers which is proportional to 
number of consumers. So cost of each oligopoly can be expressed as follows: 
( )C q qc=                                          (2) 
 
5.  MODEL 
 
Cournot model and Stackelberg model is on output game based on hypothesis of the same quality and 
price of service and goods, Bertrand model is on price game【1】, Hottelling model explain price game of 
goods and service which have some substitute effect【2】. Now because restricted by properties of demand 
function, linear demand and supply function cannot be used to analysis game model on price and output 
change at the same time. But the instance of price and output (here is number of consumers) changes at 
the same time appears always in many marketing. 
  Service price of each oligopoly is mainly1 decided by government and has been adjusted to adapt to 
development demand of communication industry. Although prices always changes, they keep value 
sequence in marketing by meeting requires of government.  
Service price of oligopolies can be expressed as:  
i i Tp t p=                                                (3) 
Tp is the price of China Telecom, i  is a variable representing China Telecom, China Mobile, China 
Unicom and China Netcom. For example, Mp  is service price of China Mobile, Up  is service price of 
China Unicom and Np is service price of China Netcom.  
It is important to point, it is a function which changes by time. Time is one of variables of this 
function which comprise other variables.  Here for wider application we use abstract expression. In each 
game model, price is different by real situation of marketing. 
WANG Langfeng, HU Hanhui/Management Science and Engineering 
 Vol.2 No.2 2008 18-26 
 21
 
5.1 The first game stage ---China Telecom setup, Communication was separated 
from post  
China Telecom shares total communication marketing when China Telecom was separated from China 
Post. Then price function of China Telecom is: 
( )
pq c
a bq q qc
π = −
= − −                              (4) 
Here, ( )C q  present cost function,  
( )C q qc=                                                    (5) 
Price is the function of output 
 ( )p p q=                                                    (6) 
*q  is equilibrium number of consumer. 
Equilibrium number of consumer means 
* *
* *
a r g m a x ( )
( ) ( )
q q
q P q C q
π∈
= −                  (7) 
The way to find out equilibrium is to derivative price function of China Telecom and makes it equal 
to zero 
' '( ) ( ) ( ) 0P q qP q C q
q
δπ
δ = + − =                   (8) 
Reaction function is 
( )q R q=                                                       (9) 
Reaction function means the best stratagem for China Telecom. For concrete results, optimal 
conditions can be work out when we use expression  
( )C q qc=                                                      (10) 
( )p p q a bq= = −                                       (11) 
Then optimal condition is: 
2 0a c bq
q
δπ
δ = − − =                          (12) 
Reaction function is 
* 1( ) ( )
2
q R q a c
b
= = −
                            (13) 
At this time, equilibrium number of consumers can be worked out: 
2
a cp∗ +=
                                               (14) 
Equilibrium profit is: 
* 2( ) ( ) 4q a c bπ = −                                (15) 
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5.2  The second game stage---China Mobile setup, mobile was separated from 
telecom 
China Mobile, as mobile communication supplier, has some substitute impact on fixed network 
monopolized by China Telecom. Influence of China Mobile on fixed network is a complete-information 
dynamic game in that China Mobile setup after China Telecom appearing. Each oligopoly, as game 
player, aimed at maximal profit and arrives at equilibrium status finally. 
By hypothesis mentioned above, demand function of fixed network can be expressed: 
p a bq= −                                                    (16) 
Service price of China Mobile is decided by government and has been adjusted by marketing situation, 
so it can be expressed by price of China Telecom: 
M m Tp t p=                                                    (17) 
Time is one of variables of this function which comprise other variables. 
Here mt  is a function which changes by time, other condition is on the same with above game model. 
Profit of China Mobile connects with number of consumers of China Telecom existing in marketing, 
so profit function is: 
( )M M M Mp q c qπ = −  
2
( )m M T M M
m M m M m T M M
t a bq bq q cq
t aq t bq t bq q cq
= − − −
= − − −       (18) 
The way to find out equilibrium is working out derivative of profit function of China Mobile and 
makes it equal to zero  
2 0m m M m T
M
t a t bq t bq c
q
δπ
δ = − − − =         (19) 
At this time, 
2
( 2)
2
m M m m T
m m
t bq t a t bq c
t a t c
= − −
+ −=
                           (20) 
Equilibrium number of consumers is: 
( 2)
4
m m
M
m
t a t cq
t b
∗ + −=
                                 (21) 
Equilibrium price is: 
2[ ( 2) ]
16
m m
M
m
t a t c
t b
π ∗ + −=
                                 (22) 
 
5.3 The third game stage---China Unicom setup, direct competition appears 
For break the monopoly status of China Telecom and China Mobile in fixed network domain and mobile 
communication area, the Chinese government established China Unicom. Then three players, China 
Telecom and China Mobile, China Unicom, appear in fixed network communication marketing. China 
Unicom, as all-operation supplier, has been supple little fixed network communication service, so we 
ignore impact on fixed network produced by it. China Unicom and China Mobile have some substitute 
impact on fixed network of communication marketing. Influence of China Unicom on fixed network is a 
complete-information dynamic game in that China Unicom setup after China Telecom and China Mobile 
appearing. Each oligopoly, as game player, aimed at maximal profit and arrives at equilibrium status 
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finally. 
By hypothesis mentioned above, demand function of fixed network is 
p a bq= −                                                    (23) 
Service price of China Unicom is decided by government and has been adjusted by marketing 
situation, so it can be expressed by price of China Telecom: 
U u Tp t p=                                                         (24) 
Here ut  is a function which changes by time, other condition is on the same with above game model. 
Profit of China Unicom connects with number of consumers of China Telecom and China Mobile, so 
profit function is: 
( )U U U Up q c qπ = −  
( )u U M T U Ut a bq bq bq q cq= − − − − 2U U U U U U M U U T Ut aq t bq t bq q t bq q cq= − − − −      (25) 
The way to find out equilibrium is working out derivative of price function for China Unicom and 
make derivative equal to zero 
2 0U U U U M U T
U
t a t bq t bq t bq c
q
δπ
δ = − − − − = (26) 
Then 
2 U U U U T U Mt bq t a t bq t bq c= − − −     (27) 
Now equilibrium number of consumers of China Telecom and China Mobile getting up to maximum 
profits can be work out  
* 1 ( )
2T
q a c
b
= − ( 2)4
m m
M
m
t a t cq
t b
∗ + −=
    (28) 
Number of consumers of China Unicom turning up to equilibrium is 
( ) 2 ( 2 )
8
m u u m
u
m u
t t a c c t tq bt t
∗ + + −=
   (29) 
Equilibrium profit is 
2
2
[ ( ) 2 ( 2 )]
64
M u u m
U
m u
t t a c c t t
bt tπ
∗ + + −=
           (30) 
 
5.4  The fourth game stage---original China Telecom was divided to China 
Netcom and new China Telecom 
Then the operation of China Telecom dominated by Chinese government was divided into south 
operation and north operation. China Netcom incorporated original northern China Telecom and enters 
fixed network of communication marketing.  New China Telecom has only southern operation of 
original China Telecom. New China Telecom and China Netcom conduct business all over Chinese 
Mainland for maximal profit and compete in north and south China.  
For analysis convenience, we suppose that there exists a Pseudo-China Netcom. As a pseudo-player, 
WANG Langfeng, HU Hanhui/Management Science and Engineering 
 Vol.2 No.2 2008 18-26 
 24
Pseudo-China Netcom enters fixed network of communication marketing and conduct four player game. 
Now, 3 existent and 1 new player compete for maximal profit and arrive at equilibrium status finally. 
This game is a complete information dynamic game. 
Service price of China Netcom is decided by government and has been adjusted by marketing 
situation, so Pseudo-China Netcom can be expressed by price of original China Telecom: 
N n Tp t p=                                                        (31) 
Here nt  is a function which changes by time, other condition is on the same with above game models. 
nt is different from mt  of China Mobile and ut  of China Unicom mentioned above which express 
substitute effect on fixed network communication marketing, nt  express  new price of Pseudo-China 
Netcom which origin from northern original China Telecom and is decided by competition between new 
China Telecom and China Netcom.  
( )N N N Np q c qπ = −  
( )n U M T n n nt a bq bq bq bq q cq= − − − − −  
2( )n U M T n n n nt a bq bq bq q t bq cq= − − − − −    (32) 
The way to find out equilibrium is working out derivative of profit function of Pseudo-China Netcom 
and makes it equal to zero 
 
2 0n n n T n M n u U U
n
t a t bq t bq t bq t bq c
q
δπ
δ = − − − − − = (33) 
At this time, 
2 n n n n T n M n ut bq t a t bq t bq t bq c= − − − −      (34) 
Now equilibrium number of consumers of China Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom getting 
up to maximum profits can be work out  
* 1 ( )
2T
q a c
b
= −
 
( 2)
4
m m
M
m
t a t cq
t b
∗ + −=
 
( ) 2 ( 2 )
8
m u u m
u
m u
t t a c c t tq bt t
∗ + + −=
 (35) 
Equilibrium number of consumer of Pseudo-China Netcom can be work out 
( ) 2 4 8
16
m u n u n m n u m
n
m u n
t t t a c ct t ct t ct tq
bt t t
∗ + + + −=
(36) 
Equilibrium profit is 
2
2 2
[ ( ) 2 ( 2 4 ]
256
m u n u n m n u m
n
n m u
t t t a c c t t t t t t
bt t t
π ∗ + + + −=
(37) 
The game process of Pseudo-China Netcom entering fixed network of communication marketing is a 
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complete information dynamic game. 
In fact we need new China Telecom and China Netcom which are produced by original China 
Telecom. So number of consumers of new China Telecom arriving at equilibrium status is: 
2 2
( ) 2 4 81 ( )
4 32
t n
n
m u n u n m n u m
m u n
q qq
t t t a c ct t ct t ct ta c
b bt t t
• = + =
+ + + −− +
(38) 
Profit of New China Telecom arriving at equilibrium status is: 
22
2 2
2 2
[ ( ) 2 ( 2 4 ]( )
8 512
t n
n
m u n u n m n u m
n m u
t t t a c c t t t t t ta c
b bt t t
π ππ • = + =
+ + + −− +
(39) 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Profits of any oligopoly is not only dominated by similar service providers to compete directly, but 
also affected by the pressure of alternative competitors. These oligopolies can use these relations to 
analyze their response in different stages of the game. Government can adjust relations of oligopolies for 
regulations of communication industry. From our game analysis can be seen relationships of customers 
and market price of oligopolies which can be serving as reference to predict their potential markets for 
major oligopolies and as directions to make decision of long-term market development strategies to 
avoid over-investment and growth based on actual market Stage. 
6.2  The earlier appearing in communication marketing, the higher profit obtained by oligopolies, the 
greater initiative are they. Otherwise, new player who want enter communication marketing must 
consider service price of reigning oligopolies and profit of new player is influenced by existence, their 
relations is shown as models.  
6.3  At a specific market, these models can help each oligopoly calculate numbers of consumers and 
profit of main game players. 
Analyses of Game process which has some substitute relations can reference to the method used in 
these models. 
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